This study experimentally tests the effect of information transparency on the probability of coordination failure in global games with finite signals. Prior theory has shown that in global games with unique equilibrium, the effect of information transparency is ambiguous. We find that in global games where the signal space is finite, increased transparency has two effects. First, increasing the level of transparency usually destroys uniqueness and precipitates multiple equilibria, so that the effect of transparency on coordination depends crucially upon which equilibrium is actually attained. Second, the level of transparency determines which of these equilibria is risk dominant. We find that increased transparency facilitates coordination only if it switches the risk-dominant equilibrium from the secure equilibrium to the efficient equilibrium. When the converse is true, improved transparency can be dysfunctional because it increases the probability of coordination failure.
I. Introduction
Economic settings with strategic complementarities and complete information are usually plagued by multiple equilibria. There is an efficient, Pareto superior, equilibrium and an inferior, but secure, equilibrium. The multiplicity of equilibria creates strategic uncertainty, in that each individual player is unsure which equilibrium others are playing. Coordination failure occurs when players are unable to coordinate their actions to attain the Pareto superior equilibrium. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that bank runs are a consequence of such coordination failures. But, the harmful effects of coordination failure are not confined to macro-economic phenomena. It is also a pervasive management problem. Consider the case of a firm undertaking a strategic initiative to improve, say, customer satisfaction. Successful implementation of the program depends on the actions of individuals and departments at every level of the organization. Each manager must decide whether to commit scarce resources to the program. Even a small loss of confidence that others will stay the course to achieve the Pareto superior equilibrium can lead to the individual defection of every agent, resulting in coordination failure. Thus a promising initiative could fail. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1990) provide experimental evidence that even in simple two-person coordination games with complete information, the Pareto superior equilibrium is not guaranteed. Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) found that when the number of players is large coordination failure is almost certain to occur. In another experiment, Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1991) examine equilibrium selection in an average opinion game with secure and efficient equilibria. They find that subjects converge to the efficient equilibrium only when the secure equilibrium is rendered non-salient, and vice versa. When both strategies are salient, neither equilibrium is supported. Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) argued that the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games is an artifact of the assumption that the payoff structure of every player is common knowledge. They studied a global game structure, where Nature first randomly chooses the coordination game to be played from a subclass of 2 X 2 games and then each player observes a noisy, idiosyncratic, signal of the selected game. They established that in such global games the equilibrium is unique, and that as the noise in player's observations vanishes, the sequence of unique equilibria converges to the risk dominant equilibrium of the game actually selected by Nature. Thus, if games of complete information are viewed as limits of games with incomplete information, then risk dominance, as proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , is a compelling equilibrium selection criterion. Global games have been used to study many macroeconomic phenomena such as currency attacks (Morris and Shin, 1998) , premature foreclosure of loans (Morris and Shin, 2004) and bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) . Morris and Shin (2003) provides an excellent overview of global game applications. The common finding in these studies is that even though the multiplicity of equilibrium problem disappears, there is still a non-empty region of fundamentals where inefficient equilibria are attained due to lack of coordination.
The motivation for our paper is twofold. First, we provide experimental evidence on whether increasing the transparency of information received by individual agents in global games increases or decreases the region of inefficiency where coordination failure occurs. The importance of this question is apparent from the empirical observation that most public incidents of coordination failure are accompanied by a clamor for increased transparency. Morris and Shin (2004) were the first to pose this problem. They established that when uniqueness of equilibrium is preserved, the effect of increased transparency is ambiguous, and there are parameter values where increased transparency of information actually increases the incidence of coordination failure. We add to the Morris and Shin result by studying settings where increasing the transparency of information destroys uniqueness and precipitates multiple equilibria. The uniqueness of equilibrium in global games depends upon smooth variation in the beliefs of individual players as signals vary. In many situations, especially those arising in corporate management settings, the space of fundamentals over which there is uncertainty and the set of signals from which agents draw is finite. In such finite settings, there are discrete jumps in players' beliefs and it is easy to find examples where increased transparency of information destroys uniqueness of equilibrium and precipitates multiple equilibria.
In these cases, increased transparency induces an equilibrium selection problem. Therefore, the effect of increasing the transparency of information received by agents depends crucially upon which equilibrium is actually selected. Our second objective is to shed light on the equilibrium selection problem in global game settings with finite signals where multiple equilibria occur. We provide experimental evidence that players in the global game converge rapidly to the equilibrium that is risk dominant in an "otherwise identical" game where fundamental uncertainty remains but there is no uncertainty about the beliefs of other players.
Our experiments are based on the Morris and Shin (2004) model of loan foreclosure decisions. We run experiments where the multiple equilibria generated by increased transparency consists of both an efficient equilibrium and an inefficient equilibrium. In some of our treatments, increased transparency makes the efficient equilibrium risk dominant in the "otherwise identical" game, while in other treatments increased transparency makes the inefficient equilibrium risk dominant. We find that in all our treatments, subjects converge rapidly to the risk dominant equilibrium, regardless of whether it is efficient or inefficient. Thus, we conclude that increased transparency is socially desirable only when it also makes the efficient equilibrium risk dominant. In cases where the inefficient equilibrium becomes risk dominant, increased transparency is socially undesirable. Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004) present related experimental evidence on the importance of risk dominance in equilibrium selection. They compare equilibria in complete information currency attack games where the state is publicly revealed, to equilibria in global games where each player receives a noisy private signal of the state. In the former setting there are multiple equilibria, while in the global game setting there is a unique equilibrium characterized by a threshold signal above which players attack the currency peg. Their experimental finding is that players converge to a unique threshold strategy in both settings. Moreover the threshold adopted in the public information setting is close to the unique threshold implied by vanishing signal noise in the corresponding global game. Thus players appear to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium in the public information game, and other equilibrium selection criteria do not have as much explanatory power. Anctil, Dickhaut, Kanodia, and Shapiro (ADKS, 2004 ) also examine the role of information in global games. They find that the efficient equilibrium emerges when the prior public information is sufficiently optimistic; and the secure equilibrium emerges when this information is not optimistic. They conjecture that information plays a role because it influences which equilibrium is risk dominant. The results of our study indicate that the conjecture made in ADKS is indeed correct.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide the theory underlying our experiments. In Section III we describe our experimental design, experimental procedures and the specific parameters used in our treatments. Section IV describes our experimental results, and Section V concludes the paper.
II. The Loan Foreclosure Game with Finite Signals
Consider a finite number of creditors (there are eight creditors in each of our experiments) who must each independently decide whether to rollover or foreclose a loan that was earlier made to finance a risky project. There are three possible states, bankrupt (B), uncertain (U) and solvent (S).
In state B the project fails regardless of what creditors do, and any creditor who rolls over her loan receives a payoff of zero. In state S, the project succeeds regardless of creditors' actions and any creditor who rolls over her loan receives a payoff R > 0. In state U, the project succeeds if and only if at least z < 8 of the 8 creditors roll over their loans, in which case creditors who roll over each receive the payoff R. In all three states, any creditor who forecloses receives a secure payoff λ, 0 < λ < R, regardless of what other creditors do. Thus, as depicted below, creditors play one of the three possible games indexed by the state. For expositional ease, we describe the payoffs for two person games -the extension to 8 player games is straight forward.
Game B
Since foreclose is a dominant action in Game B and rollover is a dominant action in Game S, the Nash equilibrium is unique in these games. However Game U has two Nash equilibria, {rollover, rollover} and {foreclose, foreclose}, with the former being Pareto superior. If Game U is being played and the {foreclose, foreclose} equilibrium is attained, there is coordination failure.
However, players do not know which of the three games is being played. Nature makes this choice with probabilities π π π We restrict attention to pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibria. A pure strategy for each player is a function σ(.) specifying an action contingent on each signal. Since signal l communicates that state B has occurred for certain and since foreclose is a dominant action in state B, σ(l) = foreclose must be part of any equilibrium strategy profile. Similarly, since receipt of signal h makes rollover a dominant action, σ(h) = rollover must be part of any equilibrium strategy profile. Now, consider a creditor's problem when she observes signal m. Given signal m, each of the three states has positive probability, and the posterior probabilities, Prob(B|m), Prob(U|m), and Prob(S|m) can be calculated via Bayes theorem. Since project success is guaranteed in state S regardless of other players' actions, the action rollover is a dominant action for any player who receives signal m if :
Also, since project failure is guaranteed in state B regardless of other players' actions, foreclose is a dominant action for any player who receives signal m if :
If either (1) or (2) is satisfied, there is a unique equilibrium in the global game. A creditor's choice is more difficult when both (1) and (2) are violated, i.e., when:
Let Ω be the non-empty set of parameters {π B , π U , π S , r B , r S , λ, R} which satisfy (3).
When (3) is satisfied, a creditor receiving signal m must additionally assess the probability of project success in each of the three feasible states. Since this probability is exogenously given for states B and S, the critical assessment is the probability of success in state U. Because all creditors receive signal m when the state is U, a creditor's assessment of the probability of project success in state U is determined by her belief of what other creditors will do upon receiving signal m. Since other creditors are thinking likewise, this assessment implicitly depends on the entire hierarchy of higher order beliefs -beliefs about other creditors' beliefs, beliefs about others' beliefs about others' beliefs and so on. If each creditor believes that others will rollover upon observing m then each creditor must assess the probability of success in state U to be one, and if each creditor believes that others will foreclose upon observing m then each creditor must assess the probability of success in state U to be zero. In the former case σ(m) = rollover is an equilibrium supported by self-fulfilling beliefs and in the latter case σ(m) = foreclose is an equilibrium supported by self-fulfilling beliefs.
Thus, in the global game, there are two equilibrium strategy profiles each supported by self-fulfilling beliefs. The equilibrium selection problem reappears. This situation is endemic in global games with a finite number of signals because there are discrete jumps in players' beliefs.
We now define an "otherwise identical" game where the notion of risk dominance is well defined. Suppose that only one signal is drawn in accordance with the prior probabilities of the three states and the conditional probabilities described in Table I , and this signal is publicly announced. In this otherwise identical game there is no private information, only public information. Thus, when signal m is drawn and publicly announced, fundamental uncertainty is still present, but there is no uncertainty about the information of other players. The game contingent on signal m has common knowledge, so it is essentially a game of complete information with payoffs replaced by expected payoffs (see Hellwig, 2002) . We call this game PI(m) and depict it below for the case of two players.
Game PI(m)
It should be noted that game PI(m) is different from the situation where a player privately observes signal m. In the latter case, each of the other players could have received any signal from {l, m} or any signal from {h, m}, so there is uncertainty about other players beliefs. In game PI(m) there is no uncertainty about other players' beliefs.
When the inequalities in (3) are satisfied, game PI(m) has two equilibria, {rollover, rollover} and {foreclose, foreclose}. The risk-dominant equilibrium is that equilibrium which has the largest product of deviation losses. So {rollover, rollover} is risk dominant if,
and, {foreclose, foreclose} is risk dominant if the inequality in (4) is reversed. Which of the two equilibria is efficient? Since message m provides only noisy information about the state, efficiency must be assessed from an ex ante perspective. A creditor's expected payoff from the {rollover, rollover} equilibrium is:
Her expected payoff from the {foreclose, foreclose} equilibrium is:
Pr ( 
this probability is strictly decreasing in r S and strictly increasing in r B . Also since
this sum of probabilities is also strictly decreasing in r S and strictly increasing in r B . Therefore, an increase in the parameter r S decreases the left hand side and increases the right hand side of (4).
Increases in the parameter r B have the opposite effect, increasing the left hand side and decreasing the right hand side of (4). Therefore, within the set of parameters contained in Ω, an increase in transparency caused by an increase in r S will tend to make the {foreclose, foreclose} equilibrium risk dominant. On the other hand, increases in transparency caused by an increase in the parameter r B will tend to make the {rollover, rollover} equilibrium risk dominant. Since the latter is always the efficient equilibrium, an increase in transparency could be socially desirable or socially undesirable depending on whether, or not, it results in the efficient equilibrium becoming risk dominant.
The above proposition depends crucially upon players choosing the predicted risk dominant equilibrium in global games with multiple equilibria, regardless of how increased transparency is attained and regardless of which equilibrium is more efficient. The experiments we describe in the rest of the paper are designed precisely to test for such behavior.
III. Experimental Design

Treatments and Predictions
In the experiment a creditor group consists of eight players, with z=5, meaning that project success in state U requires at least five players to roll over. Table 2 summarize the parameters and transparency levels used in the experiment.
[ Table 2 ]
In the Optimistic setting, as described in Panel A of Table 2 But, this time, since Prob(U|m) + Prob(S|m) -
, the strategy profile {rollover, rollover} is risk dominant as argued in (4). Thus in the Optimistic setting, the equilibrium in the global game is unique and is supported by dominant strategies when transparency is low, but increasing the level of transparency precipitates multiple equilibria. Given multiple equilibria, the risk dominant strategy is inefficient with "higher transparency", but is efficient with "highest transparency."
In the Pessimistic setting, as described in Panel B of Table 2 and Prob(U|m) = 0.7143, which, from (3), again implies that there are multiple equilibira, and, this time, the strategy profile {foreclose, foreclose} is risk dominant. Thus, once again as transparency is increased the equilibrium in the global game moves from a unique equilibrium supported by dominant strategies to multiple equilibria. However, in contrast to the Optimistic setting, in the Pessimistic setting the risk dominant strategy is efficient with "higher transparency", but is inefficient with "highest transparency."
Our equilibrium predictions, together with equilibrium expected payoffs and the expected losses from deviations are summarized in Panels A and B of Table 3 . The strategy σ(l) = foreclose, σ(m) = rollover, σ(h) = rollover, is labeled Fl, and the strategy σ(l) = foreclose, σ(m) = foreclose, σ(h) = rollover, is labeled Fm.
[ Table 3 ]
Procedures
All six of the experimental manipulations described above were tested at the Bell Laboratory for Experimental Economics at the Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations (CIRANO), in Montreal, Quebec. In total, 138 subjects participated. Prior to each session, participants completed a set of instructions provided in written and oral form, and completed interim questions and an overall questionnaire on the procedures. Each person then participated in an unspecified number of decision periods, where in each period he or she was randomly grouped with seven other participants. 2 The appendix to this paper shows a copy of the instructions and questionnaire participants completed in the Optimistic, Low transparency cell of the experiment.
Aside from differences in numerical parameters, all instructions and questionnaires used in the experiment were identical. Each session covered approximately two hours and paid participants an average of $44.58 (CAD). The following paragraph describes the participants' information and decisions in a session.
In each session participants are publicly informed of the payoff structure and the information structure they face throughout the session, via both the instructions and computer screen displays.
Each period, participants were allowed to choose from four feasible decision rules:
• Continue always, regardless of your clue (RA);
• Withdraw if your clue is low, otherwise continue (FL);
• Withdraw if your clue is low or medium, otherwise continue (FM);
• Withdraw always, regardless of your clue (FA).
Each period each participant submits a decision rule to the experimenter prior to receiving his/her randomly assigned seven other responders for the purpose of determining project outcome and their payoffs. The difference between a group member and an alternate is that the decisions of the alternates did not affect project outcomes of any group. This method yielded three groups and zero alternates in four sessions and two groups with five alternates in two sessions.
IV. Results
Tables 4 and 5 show the frequency with which each decision rule was the modal choice of each participant.
[TABLES 4 AND 5] Panel A of Table 4 
[TABLE 7]
Panels A and B of Table 7 show that ex post, the risk-dominant decision rule had the highest payoff of any strategy across treatments.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this experiment we study a large group's ability to coordinate on an efficient strategy under different levels of transparency of private information. One clear outcome of this study is that of public information, focusing on presenting a strong sense of "top management buy-in" that can help to establish optimistic priors on the success of a project. Our study does not offer an explicit remedy for coordination failure, but indicates that an increase in the transparency of information will not always work. The interaction between transparency and risk dominance is crucial. 1  12  11  0  0  17  3  0  2  1  18  5  0  1  10  13  0  0  17  4  0  3  3  20  1  0  0  9  15  0  1  19  1  0  4  0  23  1  0  0  7  17  0  2  17  0  0  5  2  21  1  0  0  6  18  0  0  19  0  0  6  1  21  2  0  1  4  19  0  1  18  0  0  7  0  23  1  0  1  5  18  0  1  17  1  0  8  2  21  1  0  0  4  20  0  0  19  0  0  9  0  23  0  1  1  0  23  0  0  19  0  0  10  0  24  0  0  1  3  20  0  1  18  0  0  Tota  l   12  209  18  1  6  60  174  0  6  180  9  0 In the Optimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (π B = .30), Uncertain (π U = .20), and Solvent (π S = .50). The Highest Transparency Optimistic setting had 21 participants, however, one participant did not respond in set one and two participants did not respond in sets four through ten. 0  13  9  1  2  0  11  10  0  0  12  11  1  0  12  12  0  3  1  8  12  0  0  15  7  1  1  11  11  1  4  1  4  15  1  0  19  4  1  0  12  12  0  5  0  5  16  0  0  20  3  1  0  10  14  0  6  0  4  17  0  0  19  4  1  0  5  19  0  7  0  3  18  0  0  19  4  1  0  5  19  0  8  0  2  19  0  0  22  1  1  0  8  16  0  9  0  1  20  0  0  22  1  1  0  2  22  0  10  0  0  21  0  0  22  1  1  0  4  20  0  Tota  l   2  48  159  1  0  184  46  9  1  82  154  2 In the Pessimistic setting, the prior probabilities (π) for the three states of nature are as follows: Bankrupt (π B = .50), Uncertain (π U = .20), and Solvent (π S = .30). The Highest Transparency Pessimistic setting had 24 participants, however, one participant did not respond in set one. In the Optimistic setting, the prior probabilities ( 
Your Role in the Experiment
Throughout the experiment, you will be randomly grouped with 7 other participants. You and the other participants will each be a creditor to a company to whom you have lent money. The company has borrowed your money in order to fund a project. Each creditor (including you) will decide whether to (1) Continue to invest his or her money in the company until the project is complete, or (2) Withdraw his or her money before the project is complete.
The experiment will consist of multiple sets. Each set has 10 rounds. For example, two sets include a total of 20 rounds, and 40 sets include a total of 400 rounds. You will not know how many sets will be played until the experiment ends.
Your Payoffs
As shown in Table 1 , your payoffs in each round will depend on your decision (Continue or Withdraw) and whether the project succeeds or fails. When you make your decision, you will not know for certain whether the project will succeed or fail. Please take a moment to review Table 1 : Below, please write down your answers to the following questions on this page about Table 1 . In a few moments the experimenter will review the correct answers with you. Below, please write down your answers to the following questions on this page about Table 2 . In a few moments the experimenter will review the correct answers with you. Each experimental round, a computer will randomly select one of the three states of nature based on the percentages shown in Table 2 . You will not observe which state of nature the computer has selected. Instead, you will observe one of three clues (Low, Medium, or High) about the state of nature. Each creditor will observe only his or her clue. After you receive your clue, you will decide whether to continue to invest or withdraw your money. Figure 1 shows the clues and project outcomes for each state of nature. Below, please write down your answers to the following questions on this page about Figure 1 . In a few moments the experimenter will review the correct answers with you. The decision rules are displayed in the upper right corner of your computer screen. During the experiment you will indicate your choice by clicking on the appropriate box.
Choose your decision rule carefully because it will remain in effect for 10 experimental rounds. After that, you may revise your decision rule for the next set of 10 rounds, and so on.
How Your Decision Rule Will Be Executed
Your decision rule will be executed in the following manner for each experimental round:
1. The computer will use the percentages in Table 2 and Figure 1 to generate a state of nature and private clues for each creditor.
2. The computer will compare your private clue with your decision rule to determine whether you continue to invest or withdraw your money for that round.
3. The computer will tabulate how many creditors continue to invest, determine whether the project fails or succeeds, and calculate your payoff for that round.
Market Activity and Payoff Report
The middle of your computer screen will report the market activity and payoff information in Table  3 . This table will be displayed as shown below. For this example, suppose that you chose the decision rule which states "Withdraw if your clue is Low, otherwise continue" and that Round 4 has just been completed. Please take a few moments to verify that you understand the information in Table 3 : Table 3 is displayed in the middle of your computer screen and will be updated after each experimental round.
Set Choices and Payoffs
After each experimental round, the computer will report your Set Choices and Payoffs in Table 4 . This table will appear at the bottom of your computer screen. The table will be displayed as follows: Table 4 is displayed at the bottom of your computer screen.
Summary of Experimental Procedures
The experiment consists of multiple sets of 10 rounds. You will not know how many sets will be played until the experiment ends. Each set of 10 rounds will consist of the following steps:
1. You will be randomly and anonymously grouped with seven other creditors. For each set of 10 rounds you will be grouped with a different set of seven creditors. If the number of creditors exceeds an exact multiple of 8, the computer will randomly select the remaining creditors to serve as alternates for that set. The computer will randomly select different alternates for each set. Each alternate will be randomly grouped with seven other creditors in order to receive payoffs as fully participating creditors.
2. You will privately select your decision rule for the entire set of 10 rounds.
3. In each of the 10 rounds, the computer will select the state of nature and your private clue. Your investment decision will be executed on your behalf based on your decision rule.
4. For each round, your payoff will be computed based on your investment decision and whether the project succeeded or failed.
5. At the end of each round, you will receive a Market Activity and Payoff Report.
6. Steps 3 -5 will be repeated for each of the 10 rounds in the set.
Limited Time to Make Decisions
Before the first set of 10 rounds commences, you will have 2 minutes to select a decision rule. For subsequent sets, you will have 1 minute to select a decision rule. You may change your selection any time during this allotted time period. Your computer monitor will display a reminder message thirty seconds before your allotted decision time expires. When the allotted time expires, the computer will execute your decision rule on your behalf for 10 rounds. If you fail to select a decision rule within the allotted time for a particular set, you will not participate in that particular set and your payoff for that set will be $0.00.
Conclusion of the Experiment
At the conclusion of the experiment, an experimenter will ask you to please quietly remain seated. To receive your earnings, you must first hand in your instructions booklet (including the questionnaire on the following pages) and sign a payment receipt form. 
